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THE FRAGILE BOND between an airline and its pas-
senger is easily strained by the frustrating task of sepa-
rating the traveler and his luggage at the start of the
journey and subsequently reuniting the two - at the same
time, at the right place - at the end of the journey. Pas-
sengers love to complain about the airline industry's im-
perfect record in baggage-handling. Often, the
frustration felt by the traveler who started his vacation
without his golf clubs or reported for a key meeting with-
out her briefcase, turned to anger when it was discovered
that the carrier's liability exposure for the lost articles was
severely limited.
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Historically, the regulatory scheme which developed
around commercial aviation worked decidedly in favor of
air carriers, permitting them to cap the dollar value of
their maximum exposure for lost baggage. Lawsuits by
irate travelers, seeking to set aside these severe restric-
tions, were uniformly unsuccessful.' The deregulation of
the airline industry, 2 however, greatly altered the rules by
which the baggage liability game will now be played. At
the same time, the risks for air carriers have increased for
two reasons: (1) the development of the hub and spoke
system, which replaced point to point travel with connect-
ing flights, requires air carriers to transfer passenger and
luggage from plane to plane, greatly increasing the odds
of misplaced luggage; and (2) the abolition of the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) weakened the regulatory pro-
tection from baggage claims enjoyed by air carriers in the
past. What remains to be seen is whether air carriers will
adopt new strategies to cope with these changes before
the traveling public appreciates the import of deregula-
tion on baggage claim liability and tries to even the score.
This Article will explore the law under which a claim for
lost or damaged baggage must now be litigated and ex-
plore methods air carriers might employ to lessen their
increased exposure to liability. This focus will entail a re-
view of the current regulatory law and the few court deci-
sions regarding lost or damaged baggage that have been
rendered since regulation of the industry ceased.4 A close
I See, e.g., Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir.
1969); Vogelsang v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
826 (1962); Randall v. Frontier Airlines, 397 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ark. 1975); Blair
v. Delta Air Lines, 344 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 564 (5th Cir.
1973); Mao v. Eastern Air Lines, 310 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended throughout scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
: Id; see also 14 C.F.R. § 253.5 (1989) (notice of terms of contract of carriage);
14 C.F.R. § 254.4 (1989) (domestic baggage liability provisions).
Coughlin v. Trans World Airlines, 847 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1988); Harby v.
Saadeh, 816 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1987); Deiro v. American Airlines, 816 F.2d 1360
(9th Cir. 1987); First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Airlines, 731 F.2d 1113 (3d
Cir. 1984); Neal v. Republic Airlines, 605 F. Supp. 1145 (N.D. I1. 1985); Dopf v.
United Airlines, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Pogia, Inc. v.
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look at these decisions will provide guidance to practition-
ers handling baggage claims in the future. Further, the
tenor of these court decisions make it clear that air carri-
ers must depart from their traditional methods of han-
dling baggage claim actions or confront increased and
unlimited liability.
II. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY FOR BAGGAGE CLAIMS PRIOR
TO DEREGULATION
Until the early 1980s, the rights and liabilities of pas-
sengers and carriers were strictly delineated under the
federal regulatory umbrella.5 This Article will not detail
the domestic tariff system under regulation or the deregu-
lation of the airline industry that followed.6 An analysis of
the law governing baggage liability, however, requires a
brief review of the development of the federal common
law and later treatment under the federal regulatory sys-
tem. This background is helpful in understanding recent
court decisions and to predict the direction of future lia-
bility decisions.
A. Federal Common Law
Early common-law principles governing the rights and
liabilities of carriers and shippers were developed in refer-
ence to the transportation of property by ship and rail.7
Eastern Airlines, 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,580 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988); see infra notes 77-
79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Coughlin; notes 83-105 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Deiro; notes 64-72 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of First Pennsylvania Bank; notes 73-76 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Neal; notes 12 1-122 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dopf.
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See generally Rider,A Chrono-
logical Listing of Legislation Affecting CivilAviation 1938-1980, 47J. AIR L. & Com. 257
(1982).
,; See generally Davison & Solomon, Air Carrier Liability Under Deregulation, 49 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 31 (1983) (discussing the domestic tariff system and CAB require-
ments regarding information to be included in the tariffs); Magathan & Franks,
Domestic Airline Passenger Remedies, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 647 (1983) (discussing the
CAB's role in accepting a proposed tariff by an airline); Comment, Limitations on
Air Carrier Liability: An Inadvertent Return to Common Law Principles, 48 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 111 (1982) (discussing the effect of tariffs on carrier liability).
7 See, e.g., Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397
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The carrier was viewed as an insurer of the goods, liable
unless the damage was caused by: (a) an act of God, (b) a
public enemy, (c) an act of the shipper himself, (d) public
authority, or (e) the inherent vice or nature of the goods. 8
As case law developed, carriers were permitted to limit
their liability, provided that the shipper was given ade-
quate notice of the carrier's limited liability and an oppor-
tunity to purchase increased valuation. 9 This concept,
known as the "released valuation doctrine," was validated
by the United States Supreme Court as a method of calcu-
lating the carrier's liability based upon an agreed value
rather than exculpating the carrier from its liability.' 0
Hence, while the carrier could not escape liability com-
pletely, it was permitted to limit its exposure to a prede-
termined amount." In the event transported property
(1889); Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24 (1879); Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873); Hannibal R.R. v. Swift, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 262 (1870).
" See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 509 (1913); The Majestic,
166 U.S. 375, 386 (1897); Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 177 Pa. Super.
275, 110 A.2d 892, 895 (1955).
11 See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317, 321-22 (1921) (court ex-
plained the valuation rule as an exception to the common-law rule of no exculpa-
tion from liability); Boston & Me. R.R. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439, 443-44 (1918)(shipper's acceptance of a certain valuation limits him to that value based on prin-
ciples of estoppel); Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1879) ("It is un-
doubtedly competent for carriers of passengers, by specific regulations, distinctly
brought to the knowledge of the passenger ... to protect themselves against lia-
bility, as insurers, for baggage exceeding a fixed amount in value .... ");
Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 176, 209 A.2d 697, 699 (1965)(even though bus passengers did not read the printed matter on the face of their
tickets, they were presumed to know the provisions of the tariffs filed and pub-
lished with the I.C.C.).
See Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331 (1884). The Court explained:
The distinct ground of our decision ... is, that where a contract of
the kind, signed by the shipper, is fairly made, agreeing on the valua-
tion of the property carried, with the rate of freight based on the
condition that the carrier assumes liability only to the extent of the
agreed valuation, even in case of loss or damage by the negligence of
the carrier, the contract will be upheld as a proper and lawful mode
of securing a due proportion between the amount for which the car-
rier may be responsible and the freight he receives, and of protect-
ing himself against extravagant and fanciful valuations.
Id. at 343.
" See First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Airlines, 731 F.2d 1113, 1116-19 (3d
Cir. 1984); infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case's
modern application of the released value doctrine.
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was lost or destroyed, the carrier reaped the benefits of
this doctrine because the passenger was prevented from
asserting a greater amount as the true value of the trans-
ported property when a lesser value had been utilized to
calculate the transportation rate.12 The key factor validat-
ing the imposition of this doctrine was the opportunity
given to the customer, before shipment, to declare a
higher valuation on the property for an increased trans-
portation charge.' 3
B. Federal Regulatory System
Congress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
(Act),' 4 and subsequently reenacted it in 1958,15 with the
objective of promoting public interest in air travel by
prompting air carriers to expand their services and to pro-
vide for the highest degree of safety at reasonable rates
and with fair competitive practices.' 6 For the first fifty
years the Act was in effect, the regulation of an air car-
rier's classifications, rules, regulations, practices, and
services was overseen by the CAB.17 Congress retained
the released valuation doctrine under the Act,' 8 allowing
12 See First Pennsylvania Bank, 731 F.2d at 1118.
1., See, e.g., New York N.H. & H. R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 135 (1953);
Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1921); Klicker v. Northwest Air-
lines, 563 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1977).
14 Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 977, repealed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
See 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (Supp. V 1987)
(section set forth matters in the public interest the CAB was asked to consider in
governing the airline industry).
17 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1982), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a) 4(B) (Supp. V
1987). This section provided:
Every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file with the
Board, and print, and keep open to public inspection, tariffs showing
all rates, fares, and charges for air transportation between points
served by it ... and showing to the extent required by regulations of
the Board, all classifications, rules, regulations, practices, and serv-
ices in connection with such air transportation.
Id.
, 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1982). This section provides: "Nothing contained in this
chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law
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carriers to achieve the benefits of limited liability by filing
tariffs with the CAB.' 9 These tariffs declared the limit of a
carrier's liability for losses to various types of baggage
and were deemed to be part of the contract of carriage
when the passenger purchased a ticket.20 In reviewing
these tariffs, courts held that passengers had constructive
knowledge of the tariff provisions, regardless of actual
knowledge.2 '
Courts did not question the reasonableness of a car-
rier's filed rates and limitations because the CAB had
"primary jurisdiction" over the determination of the va-
lidity of the tariff.22 Under the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine, a court may not examine the findings of a regulatory
agency unless that agency has acted arbitrarily. There-
fore, courts deemed tariff provisions properly filed with
the CAB to be valid and thus enforced them. 23 As a con-
or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies."
Id.; see also Klicker, 563 F.2d at 1314 (the court found that Congress, in enacting
§ 1506, "expressly incorporated the entire federal common law applicable to car-
riers .... ).
11, See, e.g., Vogelsang, 302 F.2d at 711 (Delta Air Lines $100 limitation of liability
tariff); Mao, 310 F. Supp. at 845 (Eastern Airlines $500 limitation of liability tariff);
Progress Jewelry Co. v, Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 335, 336(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (Northwest Orient Airlines $250 limitation of liability tariff);
Odom v. Pac. N. Airlines, Inc., 393 P.2d 112, 113 (Alaska 1964) (Pacific Northern
Airlines $100 limitation of liability tariff).
2-' See Tishman &Lipp, 413 F.2d at 1403-04; Vogelsang, 302 F.2d at 712; Lichten v.
Eastern Airlines, 189 F.2d 939, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1951); Hycel, Inc. v. American
Airlines, 328 F. Supp. 190, 192-93 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
2, See Tishman &Lipp, 413 F.2d at 1403-04 ("Limitations of liability in tariffs...
are binding on passengers and shippers whether or not the limitations are embod-
ied in the transportation documents."); Vogelsang, 302 F.2d at 712 (analogizing to
railroad carriers before the ICC); Lichten, 189 F.2d at 940-41; Hycel, 328 F. Supp.
at 192-93 (the carrier's filed tariff is an integral part of the contract "even though
the passenger or shipper may be unaware of the provisions of the tariff.").
212 See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 439-41 (1907);
Lichten, 189 F.2d at 941; see also First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Airlines, 731
F.2d 1113, 1119-22 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussion of the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion as it related to the CAB's assessment of the reasonableness of tariffs by air
carriers before deregulation); Comment, Limitations on Air Carrier Liability: An Inad-
vertent Return to Common Law Principles, 48J. AiR L. & CoM. 111 (1982).
2:1 See, e.g., Lichten, 189 F.2d at 939. In Lichten, the court upheld a tariff which
exculpated a carrier from any liability. The court determined the Civil Aeronautics
Act required it to uphold any tariffs because it was without jurisdiction to grant
relief to the plaintff until the CAB found the rules unlawful or until the plaintiff
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sequence, when confronted with a baggage claim action,
counsel for the air carriers automatically moved for sum-
mary judgment, seeking to invoke the carrier's baggage
tariffs. These motions were uniformly successful, despite
the passenger's lack of knowledge of the tariff and regard-
less of his opportunity to declare excess value.24
III. DEREGULATION AND RESIDUAL FEDERAL
REGULATIONS
A. Deregulation
In 1978, Congress enacted legislation which gradually
eliminated the CAB's regulation of domestic and foreign
aviation. 25 These "sunset provisions ' 26 of the ADA pro-
vided for the elimination of the CAB's legislative author-
ity by 1985.27 In 1983, pursuant to the ADA, air carriers
were no longer required to file tariffs with the CAB. 28 No
indication exists in the Congressional Record that Congress
specifically considered the effect of deregulation on air
carriers' capacity to limit their liability. During these
"sunset years" before deregulation, however, the CAB
was concerned about this issue. This concern is reflected
in the CAB's enactment of federal regulations, designed
to control carriers' rights to limit their liability after
deregulation.2 9
exhausted her administrative remedies. Id.; see infra notes 108-119 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion and criticism of the Lichten case.
24 See infra notes 108-127 and accompanying text for a discussion of tariffs
which abridge passenger's common-law rights.
2-, Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-904, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended throughout scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "ADA"]. See
generally Recent Development, Aviation Law - The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
20 HARV. INT'L LJ. 385 (1979) (analyzing the major changes resulting from the
enactment of the ADA with particular reference to the effect on international air
transport).
2,; 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
27 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). By 1985, all of the CAB's
authority was either terminated or transferred to other agencies. Id. at
§ 1551(b)(1)(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
-" 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2)(A) (1982).
21 14 C.F.R. §§ 253, 254 (1989); see infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text
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B. Current Federal Regulations
1. Baggage Limitation of Liability Regulations
(a) Excess Valuation
With the abolition of tariff filing requirements immi-
nent, the CAB enacted baggage liability regulations to en-
sure the continued viability of the released valuation
doctrine after deregulation." Curiously, while these reg-
ulations codified the typical tariff limitation of liability for
lost or damaged baggage at $1,250, 3' the CAB specifically
rejected a regulation which would have required air carri-
ers to offer excess valuation coverage to passengers. 2
The CAB turned a deaf ear to arguments for requiring
carriers to offer excess coverage. The foremost of these
arguments was that the enforceability of limitations under
the now controlling common law, depends upon the avail-
ability of excess insurance coverage. 3 The CAB reasoned
that regulatory intervention was not needed in this area
because air carriers typically offered excess insurance
without a Board requirement.3 4 This assumption, how-
ever, was at least partially false.
Air carriers traditionally advised the public that they
would not be responsible for damages resulting from the
transportation of certain items. For example, air carriers
typically exclude all liability for lost money, jewelry, cam-
eras, and electronic equipment. By refusing to accept any
regarding the CAB's enactment of regulations governing the carriers' capacity to
limit liability.
- Domestic Baggage Liability, 49 Fed. Reg. 5065 (1984). The regulation ini-
tially applied only to flights with 60 or more passenger seats or any flight on the
same ticket with a flight having 60 or more seats. Id.
:1 14 C.F.R. § 254.4 (1989); Domestic Baggage Liability, 49 Fed. Reg. at 5068-
70 (1984). The CAB arrived at this figure after considering the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers and the Apparel Commodities Index. Domestic
Baggage Liability, 49 Fed. Reg. at 5069. Additionally, the CAB was of the opinion
that a $1,250 baggage liability limitation was reasonable in light of the possibility
of future price movements. Id.
-1 Domestic Baggage Liability, 49 Fed. Reg. 5068 (1984).
:3Id.
:14 Id. ("The Board has decided not to impose such a requirement without a
more persuasive showing that regulatory intervention is needed.")
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responsibility for such items, air carriers contend that the
released valuation doctrine is inapplicable and that excess
valuation coverage is not available. The CAB's position
can most likely be attributed to the historical observation
that passengers rarely purchased excess coverage. None-
theless, given the air carrier's stance, the CAB's refusal to
require excess valuation coverage for all items calls into
question the effectiveness of its sunset regulatory efforts.
If, by its efforts, the CAB was attempting to maintain the
status quo for air carriers after deregulation, it has failed
to achieve this goal.
(b) Notice Requirements
The CAB adopted notice requirements that must be
given by the air carrier to the passenger regarding the car-
rier's limitation of liability for baggage." Following de-
regulation, air carriers were to provide conspicuous
written notice to passengers of any limit on liability on or
with the passenger ticket. 6 This regulation permitted the
air carrier to continue with the equivalent of a tariff filing
system while arguably providing passengers with actual
notice that limitations existed, and would be binding on
the passenger, even though not printed on the contract
ticket itself.
The CAB's expressed intent in mandating this notice
was to alert the passenger to the limitation. The CAB reg-
ulation attempts to balance the need to notify passengers
through simple terms in a cost effective manner, with the
need to make all pertinent details available to passen-
gers. In promulgating these notice provisions, the CAB
35 Id. at 5065-66. The Board rejected the analogy that liability for other bail-
ments cannot be limited by notice. Id.
-,,; 14 C.F.R. § 254.5(a)-(b) (1989). Pursuant to the enacted regulation, the air
carrier shall provide conspicuous written notice on or with the passenger ticket of
either (1) the Board mandated notice or (2) a specific statement of the air carrier's
liability to passengers. Id.
:47 Domestic Baggage Liability, 49 Fed. Reg. 5065-66 (1984). The Board previ-
ously concluded that short form ticketing was critical to the efficiency of the air
transportation system and that no cost justification existed for replacing the tariff
system with bulky individual contracts given out to each passenger. Id. The
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expressly rejected several alternative notice suggestions;
such as providing the passenger with oral notice, provid-
ing a written document that set forth the precise limita-
tion of liability, or providing ticket counter signs
containing notice of the limitation. 8 Instead, the CAB's
minimum mandated notice is most often utilized by carri-
ers as a component part of the ticket coupon and pro-
vides: "Federal rules require any limit on an airline's
baggage liability to be at least $1,250 per passenger." 9
2. Incorporation by References
(a) Purpose of Regulation
Under the tariff filing system of the CAB's era, air carri-
ers were afforded an opportunity to incorporate contrac-
tual terms by reference. By filing its tariff with the CAB,
the carrier bound its customers to provisions in the tariff
regardless of whether the provisions were embodied in
the transportation documents.40 Under this system, the
carrier could bind a passenger to its baggage tariffs with-
out providing the passenger with a copy of the tariff.
With the onset of deregulation, where tariff filings were
no longer required, consumer groups prophesied that
carriers would no longer be permitted to "incorporate by
reference" certain terms and would, thus, be exposed to
conflicting requirements of the law of the individual
states.4'
In anticipation of this potential conflict, the CAB en-
acted federal regulations which permitted incorporation
Board, therefore, amended paragraph (b)(1) of 14 C.F.R. § 253.5 to allow an air
carrier's limitation of liability for lost, damaged or delayed baggage to be incorpo-
rated by reference. 49 Fed. Reg. at 5066.
3. Id. The Board also rejected a suggestion that passengers be asked to sign a
"statement of understanding" at the time of check-in. Part of the recommenda-
tions were that this statement be kept on file and that if the carrier failed to com-
ply, it would not be able to limit its liability. Id.
- 14 C.F.R. § 254.5(b) (1989).
M See Vogelsang v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F.2d 709, 712 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 826 (1962); Mao v. Eastern Air Lines, 310 F. Supp. 844, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1 Myers & Barrus, A Practitioner's Guide to the Law Governing Airline Baggage and
Cargo Cases, 54 DEF. CouNs. J. 330, 333 (1987).
LIABILITY FOR BAGGAGE
by reference of certain contract terms, including baggage
limitation provisions.4 2 The CAB took this action despite
the fact that it had no clearly defined statutory authority
to enact these regulations.4 3 In an apparent effort to le-
gitimize the CAB's action in this regard, Congress later
amended the ADA to provide that the CAB could prop-
erly issue regulations regarding incorporation by
reference.4 4
The overriding concern of the CAB in deciding whether
to permit incorporated terms, was how to best preserve
the air carrier's short-form airline ticket while including
the necessary contract provisions.45 In the CAB's view,
detailed terms were not essential to the formation of the
contract and could, therefore, be incorporated by refer-
ence. 46 This viewpoint is disputed by consumer groups
because of the carriers' tradition of incorporating in the
tariffs detailed lists of items they would not be responsible
for in transport. From the face of the ticket, the passen-
ger does not know that certain items he is transporting
will not be covered if damaged or lost.
The CAB feared that in the absence of regulations on
the subject, courts were likely to either deny the validity of
any contract terms that the passenger did not receive ac-
tual notice of, or impose differing rules for incorporating
the terms by reference. 7 Therefore, to prevent courts
from requiring a greater degree of notice than was re-
.. Notice of Terms of Contract of Carriage, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,134 (1982) (codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. § 253 (1989)).
4-1 See H.R. REP. No. 793, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2857, 2870 (noting the CAB had purported to issue such
regulations under authority of the Federal Aviation Act).
44 49 U.S.C. § 1381(b) (Supp. V 1987) ("any air carrier may incorporate by ref-
erence in any ticket or other written instrument any of the terms of the contract of
carriage and interstate and overseas transportation, to the extent such incorpora-
tion by reference is in accordance with regulations issued by the board.").
4-5 Notice of Terms of Contract of Carriage, 48 Fed. Reg. 6317 (1983) (codified
at 14 C.F.R. § 253.2 (1989)).
46 Id. The CAB reasoned that because the names of the parties, the service to
be rendered, and the price paid for such service were on the passenger ticket,
these items were sufficient to form a contract. Id.
47 Id.
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quired by the tariff system and to foreclose state legisla-
tion on the subject, the CAB enacted 14 C.F.R. § 253.48
The CAB's actions were designed to provide the public
with proper notice while satisfying the legal system's re-
quirement of "reasonableness.
49
(b) Substance of Regulation
14 C.F.R. § 253 provides that the passenger ticket, or
any other written instrument which embodies the contract
of carriage, may incorporate contract terms by refer-
ence.50 If the air carrier chooses to incorporate contract
terms by reference, it must provide notice to the passen-
ger of the incorporated terms.5' If the air carrier fails to
give the required notice, the carrier loses the benefit of
the incorporated terms and the passenger cannot be
bound by any such term.52 It is the carrier's duty to make
available, at each of its airports and ticket offices, the text
of each incorporated term,53 and to provide, upon request
of the passenger, the full text of the terms incorporated.5 4
The CAB also delineated the nature of the notice re-
quired concerning incorporated terms. The air carrier is
required to provide "conspicuous" notice to the passen-
4. Id.
41, Id. The CAB further explained: "[The rules] provide a flexible method
whereby airlines can continue to incorporate complex terms while still using short
form ticket stock, and without levying a great cost burden." Id.
- 14 C.F.R. § 253.4(a) (1989). The regulations set forth in § 253 apply only to
"scheduled direct air carrier operations in interstate and overseas transporta-
tion." Id. § 253.2. As originally enacted, only carriers using aircraft with more
than 60 seats were permitted to incorporate terms by reference. Notice of Terms
of Contract of Carriage, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,191 (1982). This limitation was subse-
quently eliminated. Notice of Terms of Contract of Carriage, 48 Fed. Reg. 6317
(1983) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 253.2 (1989)).
.' 14 C.F.R. § 253.4(a) (1989).
12 Id. ("[T]he passenger shall not be bound by, any contract term incorporated
by reference if notice of the term has not been provided .... ).
- Id. § 253.4(b) ("Each air carrier shall make the full text of each term that it
incorporates by reference in a contract of carriage available for public inspection
at each of its airport and city ticket offices.").
I- d. § 253.4(c) ("Each air carrier shall provide free of charge ... to passen-
gers, upon their request, a copy of the full text of its terms incorporated by refer-
ence in the contract.").
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ger of any terms which have been incorporated by refer-
ence via the passenger ticket or any other written
instrument given to the passenger that embodies the con-
tract of carriage and incorporates terms by references. 55
The CAB did not define the term "conspicuous." Instead,
it acknowledged that courts would play an important role
in determining the "conspicuousness" of the notice. 56
The passenger is to receive notice that any terms which
are incorporated by reference are a part of the contract
and that the passenger has the right to inspect the full text
of each of the incorporated terms.5 7 Finally, to accom-
pany the final domestic baggage rule discussed in subsec-
tion 1 above, the CAB amended the regulations to permit
air carriers to incorporate terms concerning the air carri-
ers' limitation of liability for lost, damaged or delayed
baggage.58
Air carriers have uniformly attempted to comply with
the requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 253 by publishing a
booklet entitled "Conditions of Carriage" that contains
the incorporated terms. This booklet sets forth important
information the passenger should be aware of in refer-
ence to the carrier's position on fare changes, oversells,
baggage, check-in requirements, acceptance of passen-
gers, refunds, ticket validity and claims. The carrier con-
siders these conditions to be a binding part of the
passenger's contract of carriage that cannot be altered by
an employee of the carrier. Finally, carriers often attempt
to fulfill the notice requirement of 14 C.F.R. § 253 by stat-
ing, on a component part of the passenger ticket, that the
conditions of carriage are available on application from
the carrier. While these efforts by carriers to comply with
55 Id. § 253.5.
• Notice of Terms of Contract of Carriage, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,128, 52,132 (1982).
5 id. at 52,133. The Board required "that concise and immediate information
about the terms listed in the required notice be readily available to passengers
upon request at the locations where the carrier's tickets are sold." Id.
' 14 C.F.R. § 253.5(b)(1) (1989); see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the general notice requirements regarding limitation of liability
for carriage of baggage.
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the CAB enacted regulations may have been sufficient
prior to deregulation, they appear to be deficient under
the evolving deregulation case law.
IV. BAGGAGE CLAIM ACTIONS AFTER DEREGULATION
A. Federal Common-Law Principles Govern Baggage Claim
Actions
The deregulation of the airline industry caused com-
mentators to forecast that the common law of the state in
which an action was brought would govern future litiga-
tion regarding baggage claims. 59 Although most litigants
initiate their actions in federal court, diversity is the basis
for federal jurisdiction and state law would govern in the
absence of federal preemption. 60 Application of state law,
however, would place an obvious burden upon the car-
rier. In order to adequately protect itself, the carrier
would have to constantly monitor the law in the various
jurisdictions and modify the component parts of the con-
tract of carriage as required by each state.6' One com-
mentator even suggested that the only safe course for the
carrier would be to draft its passenger tickets so as to pro-
vide protection for the carrier in the jurisdiction which
most severely limited the carrier's rights.62 The specter of
11, See, e.g. Davison & Solomon, supra note 6, at 48 ("given deregulation, most
federal court suits against air carriers ... [for loss of or damage to baggage] will
be based on diversity of citizenship, so state, rather than federal common law can
be expected to govern."); Dickerson, Travel Law: Baggage Claims, 5 AIR L. 130,
130-33 (1980) (the author identifies three causes of action, breach of contract,
negligence and conversion, which passengers will likely use against air carriers for
lost, damaged or delayed baggage after deregulation); Wilson, Air Carrier Baggage
Loss Cases in a Regulated and Unregulated Environment, 1984 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 440,
452 ("Carriers and passengers will look to state law, including state choice of law
rules, in determining their rights and remedies in baggage loss cases.").
" See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (In an action in which thejurisdiction of a federal court is based on diversity, the federal court is required to
apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits.).
11 Wilson, supra note 59, at 452; see also Notice of Terms of Contract of Car-
riage, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,129-30 (1982) ("[A]irlines would have to constantly moni-
tor and compare the rules of each State and make adjustments for local State
law.").
2 Wilson, supra note 59, at 452.
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state judicial domain was a further concern to carriers be-
cause some states do not recognize the released valuation
doctrine at all.63
The first case decided after deregulation proved the
pundits wrong, applying the federal common-law princi-
ple of released valuation to baggage claim actions rather
than the conflicting state law. In First Pennsylvania Bank v.
Eastern Airlines,64 the passenger appealed the district
court's award of $500.00, the released value, for checks
lost during shipment that had a total value of
$364,313.45. The passenger contended that deregulation
eliminated the doctrine of released valuation and, there-
fore, that Pennsylvania state law was applicable.65 After
analyzing the federal common-law principles governing
common carriers' liability limitations and the subsequent
effect of deregulation, the Third Circuit concluded that
federal law, rather than state law, governed the enforce-
ability of the released valuation tariff provision.66
In essence, the First Pennsylvania Bank court found that
deregulation had no impact upon the applicability of the
federal common-law doctrine of released valuation. The
court viewed deregulation as merely dispensing with the
doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" and thus held that the
validity of the agreed value tariff provision was a purely
judicial question for determination by application of the
federal common law. 6 7 Before deregulation a tariff prop-
wl See, e.g., Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line v. Burleson, 320 P.2d 1104,
1105 (Nev. 1958) (Nevada does not allow a negligent carrier to impose its re-
leased value limits); Wells v. Great N. Ry., 59 Or. 165, 114 P.2d 1070 (1911)
(Oregon does not permit imposition of released value when damages result from
a carrier's negligence); Rogers v. Crespi & Co., 259 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex. Civ.
App. - Waco 1953) (under Texas common law, a common carrier is strictly ac-
countable for damages to transported goods except from acts of God or "the pub-
lic enemy").
- 731 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1984).
65 Id. at 1114.
I,,i d. at 1119. The court chronicled the development of the released valuation
doctrine and its persistence throughout regulatory legislation. Id: at 1116-19. In
particular, the court noted that the savings clause in 49 U.S.C. § 1506 carried the
doctrine over into the regulatory period of the industry. Id. at 1117.
67 Id. at 1119-22. The court found that releasing carriers of the obligation to
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erly filed was immune from judicial scrutiny because of
the presumption that the regulatory body, the CAB, acted
properly in approving the tariff. Now, with the presump-
tion removed, the courts are free to scrutinize each car-
rier's rules, effectively supplanting the CAB function.
The holding in First Pennsylvania Bank is in keeping with
the Congressional intent that federal, not state law, gov-
ern the practice of the airline industry.68 This intent was
clearly manifested when the CAB enacted and amended
14 C.F.R. §§ 253 and 254.69 While the extensive analysis
set forth by the court in First Pennsylvania Bank has been
accepted in subsequent court decisions, 70 other post de-
regulation decisions have either failed to address the is-
sue, 7' or failed to recognize that the industry has been
deregulated.72
B. Actions Must Be Based on Breach of Contract Claim
Assuming that the federal common-law doctrine of re-
file tariffs was essentially a change that eliminated the requirement of exhausting
administrative remedies. Id. at 1121.
- See H.R. REP. No. 793, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2857, 2860. In discussing consumer protection and unfair
competitive practices, Congress stated:
In addition to protecting consumers, federal regulation insures a
uniform system of regulation and preempts regulation by the states.
If there was no Federal regulation, the states might begin to regulate
these areas, and the regulations could vary from state to state. This
would be confusing and burdensome to airline passengers, as well as
to the airlines.
Id. at 2860.
I;!, See 14 C.F.R. § 253.1 (1989) (the purpose of rule "is to set uniform disclo-
sure requirements, which preempt any State requirements on the same subject").
71 See, e.g., Deiro v. American Airlines, 816 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987); Neal v.
Republic Airlines, 605 F. Supp. 1145 (N.D. 11. 1985); see infra notes 83-105 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Deiro; notes 73-76 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Neal.
71 See, e.g., Coughlin v. Trans World Airlines, 847 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1988).
Since the Ninth Circuit, in Deiro, accepted the First Pennsylvania Bank analysis that
federal law governed, it is assumed that the court did not question the issue in
Coughlin.
72 Dopf v. United Airlines, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988);
Pogia, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,580 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988).
Neither court in Dopf or Pogia recognized that deregulation had occurred. Both
courts ruled based upon the old regulations and primary jurisdiction scheme.
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leased valuation will continue to apply to baggage claim
actions, plaintiffs will be relegated to litigating baggage
claim actions only on a breach of contract theory. This
view is supported by the decision in Neal v. Republic Air-
lines.73 The passenger in Neal purported to assert causes
of action against the carrier based on allegations of
breach of contract, negligence, bailment, res ipsa loquitur,
negligent infliction of emotional distress and gross negli-
gence. 4 Relying upon the opinion in First Pennsylvania
Bank, the court concluded that a shipper seeking damages
is "bound by the terms of the carriage contract. '75 The
court ruled that the passenger could not circumvent the
contract's limitation of liability by framing his action in
terms of bailment and tort.76
The Neal case, however, raises the lingering question as
to what effect the carrier's breach of the contract terms
will have on that carrier's ability to enforce a limitation of
liability. For example, in Coughlin v. Trans World Airlines,77
the court ruled that rescission of the contract was war-
ranted for a material breach of the contract.7 8 In other
words, the carrier could not enforce the limitation of lia-
bility provision contained in the same contract it vio-
lated. 79 Instead, the carrier, by violating the contract,
exposed itself to liability beyond the agreed value.
The holdings in First Pennsylvania Bank, Neal and Cough-
7, 605 F. Supp. 1145 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
74 Id. at 1147.
75 Id. at 1148.
76 Id.
77 847 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1988).
79 Id. at 1434. The court determined that by refusing to allow the passenger to
carry the cremated remains of her husband on board "TWA breached Tariff Rule
230(B)(3) which states that valuables 'should be carried personally by the passen-
ger.' " Id.
71, Id. The court explained:
TWA's refusal to allow Mrs. Coughlin to protect her valuables by
carrying them personally effectively denied her the benefit of her
bargain with respect to the tariff agreement .... Moreover, TWA's
breach caused the very damages at issue. We conclude that TWA's
breach of the tariff agreement rendered the tariff liability limitation
unenforceable.
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lin make it clear that air carriers must strictly adhere to the
common-law principles surrounding the released valua-
tion doctrine if they are to continue to enjoy the opportu-
nity to limit their liability. At the same time, these
decisions instruct the practitioner representing a passen-
ger that the only manner in which the carrier's limitation
of liability can be circumvented is by demonstrating that
the carrier has failed to comply with the necessary prereq-
uisites for application of the doctrine: notice of the limita-
tion and the opportunity to purchase excess valuation.
This straightforward analysis, however, belies the difficul-
ties that carriers experience in complying with these
prerequisites.
C. Sufficiency of Air Carrier's Notice of Limitation of Liability
Prior to regulation, carriers were required to provide
the shipper/passenger with notice of the limitation provi-
sions before they were entitled to invoke the limitation."
During the fifty years of regulation, federal regulators cre-
ated standard ticket notices and posting requirements,
whereby the sufficiency of the notice was based solely
upon the carrier's compliance with the federal regula-
tions. The notice provisions themselves were not scruti-
nized to determine if they were adequate."' We have
already seen that the CAB, as part of its sunset activities,
sought to return carriers to the preregulation status quo
by developing a simple notice and incorporation
scheme.8 2 Air carriers, with an apparent confidence that
they could comply with the new federal regulations by
maintaining the status quo, did not substantially alter
their ticket forms. As previously noted, however, whether
the carrier's notice provisions would pass the test of "con-
spicuousness" was left to the courts to determine. Now, as
- See, e.g., The Majestic, 166 U.S. 374 (1897); La Bourgogne, 144 F. 781 (2d
Cir. 1906), aft'd, 210 U.S. 95 (1908).
"I See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tariff fil-
ing system.
"2 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the CAB
mandated notice requirements.
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evidenced by post-deregulation case law, compliance with
the federal regulations described in section III., above,
may no longer be sufficient to provide the passenger with
adequate notice under federal common law.
The most significant post-deregulation decision ren-
dered on this subject was by the Ninth Circuit in Deiro v.
American Airlines.8 3 In this action, the passenger filed suit
against American for breach of contract, negligence, and
willful and wanton misconduct in the death and injury of
several valuable greyhound racing dogs. 84 The dogs died
or were injured while being transported by American.85
The trial court limited the passenger's damages to Ameri-
can's $750 limitation of liability amount printed on the
passenger ticket."s
The Ninth Circuit chose to approach its decision by de-
termining whether the carrier's traditional method of pro-
viding notice of its baggage liability limitation was
reasonable under common-law principles. In analyzing
this issue, the court scrutinized the physical characteristics
of the passenger ticket. The ticket coupon issued to the
passenger included "Conditions of Contract," "Advice to
International Passengers and Limitations of Liability,"
and "Notice of Baggage Liability."'88 The court noted that
- 816 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987).
84 Id. at 1361-62 (Plaintiff alleged damages of approximately $900,000 for the
loss of the dogs).
.5 Id. at 1362.
- id. As noted previously, the current limitation of liability may be no less than
$1,250. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the CAB
chose the $1,250 amount.
.7 Deiro, 816 F.2d at 1362-65.
Im d. at 1362-63. The court listed the many provisions included in the several
page ticket coupon:
1) printed on the face of the ticket, along with a list of Deiro's
flights, was the following line in the upper left-hand corner printed
in very small type: "PASSENGER TICKET AND BAGGAGE
CHECK [-] SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THIS
TICKET"; 2) attached to the ticket was a page with the heading
"CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT," under which paragraph three
stated that the "services performed by each carrier are subject to: (i)
provisions contained in this ticket, (ii) applicable tariffs, (iii) carrier's
condition of carriage and related regulations which are made part
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booklets containing "Conditions of Carriage," referred to
in the ticket coupon, were available at American ticket
counters and that a "NOTICE OF BAGGAGE LIABILITY" sign
was posted at American's ticket counter at the time rele-
vant to the dispute.89 The testimony regarding whether
the passenger read the above-described notices was in dis-
pute. At a minimum, however, the passenger admitted
that he knew there was information printed on the back of
the ticket.90
The court in Deiro relied upon decisions from the First,
Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits in adopting the "reason-
able communicativeness" test to determine when a pas-
senger is contractually bound by the fine print contained
in a carrier's passenger ticket. 9' The "reasonable commu-
nicativeness" test, as adopted by the Ninth Circuit, re-
hereof (and are available on application at the offices of carrier)
and 3) printed on another page in significantly larger type were two
notices; the first with a heading "ADVICE TO INTERNATIONAL
PASSENGERS ON LIMITATION OF LIABILITY," and the second
with the heading "NOTICE OF BAGGAGE LIABILITY LIMITA-
TIONS." The second heading was for a paragraph that stated: Lia-
bility for loss, delay, or damage to baggage is limited as follows
unless a higher value is declared in advance and addtional charges
are paid: .. .(2) For travel wholly between U.S. points, to $750 per
passenger on most carriers (a few have lower limits). Excess valua-
tion may not be declared on certain types of valuable articles. Carri-
ers assume no liability for fragile or perishable articles. Further
information may be obtained from the carrier.
Id.
Id. at 1363. The court noted "[tihe wording of this sign is nearly identical to
that in the paragraph in the ticket coupon under the same heading ...." Id.
9"' Id. "At his deposition ... Deiro stated: 'You know, there's a whole bunch of
stuff printed on the back of the ticket and I didn't read all of that.' " Id.
!I Id. at 1364-65. For the decisions used by the Ninth Circuit in support of its
adoption of the reasonable communicativeness test, see Barbachym v. Costa Line,
Inc., 713 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying "reasonable notice" standard to con-
tractual limitation in steamship ticket and finding notice "not only insufficient, but
virtually nonexistent"); Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861 (1st Cir.
1983) (raising question whether entire ticket reasonably communicated "impor-
tant terms and conditions" and holding that disputed ticket, under the circum-
stances, did so); Carpenter v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 604 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1979)
("controlling principle is .. .adequate notice" of limitation; held, conspicuous
boldface type was adequate); Silvestri v. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione,
388 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968) (analyzing line of cases concerning notices in steam-
ship tickets).
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quires a two-pronged analysis. First, the court must
examine the ticket itself for such physical characteristics
as the conspicuousness and readability of the notice and
the contractual terms and limitations in question.92 Sec-
ond, the court is to review the "circumstances surround-
ing the passenger's purchase and subsequent retention of
the ticket." 93 Significantly, the second prong of the analy-
sis is weighed equally with the first in determining
whether proper notice has been given. 94 Because carriers
typically use standard airline ticket stock, the physical
characteristics and notice provisions contained in the
ticket at issue in Deiro would be similar if not identical to
tickets utilized by other carriers. Accordingly, the court's
finding in this action may have broad application in other
cases.
A critical shortcoming in the Deiro opinion is the Ninth
Circuit's indecisiveness on the issue of whether the notice
provisions contained within the ticket coupon sufficiently
met the "reasonable communicativeness" test.9 5 The
court noted that it was doubtful that the small size print
on the face of the ticket stating "SUBJECT TO CONDI-
TIONS CONTAINED IN THIS TICKET" provided
"clear and conspicuous" notice to the passenger of the
conditions of carriage. 96 Further, while the court found
the other notice provisions contained within the ticket
coupon were more clearly and conspicuously stated, the
court never expressly stated that they were sufficient.9 7
Nonetheless, in the absence of the extrinsic factors pres-
ent in Deiro, the notice provisions would probably not
have been found adequate by the court in communicating
the carrier's limitation of liability.
92 Deiro, 816 F.2d at 1364.
w, Id. "The surrounding circumstances to be considered include the passen-
ger's familiarity with the ticket, the time and incentive under the circumstances to
study the provisions of the ticket, and any other notice that the passenger received




97 Id. at 1365.
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The determinative extrinsic factors on which the Deiro
court relied were (1) that the passenger was an "exper-
ienced commercial air traveler" and (2) that the passenger
was aware there was printed material on the back of the
ticket. 98 Additionally, the fact that the passenger had pos-
session of the ticket nine days prior to his departure led
the court to surmise that "he had ample opportunity to
become familiar with the baggage liability limitations," es-
pecially since he knew that he would be shipping valuable
property.9 9 This ruling begs the question of whether rea-
sonable notice, via the printed notice provisions now uti-
lized by carriers, can ever be given to an "unseasoned
traveler" or a traveler who purchases a ticket only minutes
before departure. Even though the carrier in Deiro com-
plied with the notice provisions required in 14 C.F.R.
§ 254, it is significant that the court failed to cite this sec-
tion in reference to the adequacy of the notice provisions.
This omission implies that compliance with the notice
provision in 14 C.F.R. § 254 is insufficient to meet the
carrier's burden to provide notice to its passengers of
contract terms.' 00
The Deiro decision provides for further confusion rather
than clarity because it presents a different version of the
"reasonable communicativeness" test than other circuits
employ. Several of the circuit courts, for example, focus
only on the first prong of the test enunciated by Deiro-
namely, the physical characteristics of the passenger's
ticket.' 0 ' These courts emphasize the location of the no-
9. Id. The court found that Deiro's acknowledgment of not reading the back of
the ticket "only points to his knowledge of the existence of some kind of written
provisions or notices in the ticket." Id.
Id.
See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the adoption
of the notice provision of 14 C.F.R. § 254.
'll See, e.g., Barbachym v. Costa Line, Inc., 713 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 1983)
(finding no conspicuous language on the face of the ticket); DeNicola v. Cunard
Line Ltd., 642 F.2d 5, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1981) (upholding the lower court's use of
the physical characteristics prong); Silvestri v. Italia Societa per Azione di Naviga-
zione, 388 F.2d 11, 17 (2nd Cir. 1968) (reversing a grant of summary judgment
and applying the first prong).
LIABILITY FOR BAGGAGE
tice provisions and the sufficiency of the statement.10 2
Before the limitation provision can be held to have rea-
sonably communicated to the passenger, "the face of the
ticket must contain conspicuous language directing the
passenger's attention to the contractual terms contained
in other parts of the ticket."'' 0 3 Second, the substance of
the notice must be of such caliber that it warns the passen-
ger that the incorporated terms located elsewhere within
the ticket coupon are important matters.10 4 Under this in-
terpretation of the "reasonable communicativeness" test,
the notice American Airlines printed on the face of the
passenger's ticket in Deiro could not pass the muster of
conspicuous notice. Specifically, the notice provision
printed on the face of the ticket is the smallest print-type
size used for any notice provision. Moreover, the ticket
does not caution the passenger that he should inquire
about incorporated terms. Finally, these court decisions
did not examine the extrinsic factors considered by the
Deiro court.
The question of whether the carrier provides the pas-
senger with reasonable notice of its limitation of liability
will likely be decided on a case-by-case determination.
This reality is a complete departure from the law prior to
deregulation where carriers were accustomed to having
their notice provisions enforced without any scrutiny by
the courts. Deiro and the cases upon which it affirmatively
relies, signal air carriers that they cannot expect courts to
bind passengers to limitation of liability provisions with-
out a clear indication that the passenger had notice and an
opportunity to review the notice provisions. The burden
of proof is on the carrier to demonstrate that it acted rea-
sonably in all respects to bring the limitation to the pas-
senger's attention.° 5
1"1 See Carpenter v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 604 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1979); Silves-
tri, 388 F.2d at 17.
,,-iO'Connell v. Norwegian Caribbean Lines, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 846, 849 (N.D.
I1. 1986).
.. Silvestri, 388 F.2d at 17.
.... See id.; O'Connell v. Norwegian Caribbean Lines, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 846, 849
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D. Validity of Exculpatory Clauses
Historically, the United States Supreme Court held that
an air carrier may lawfully limit exposure to an amount
less than the actual loss sustained only where the passen-
ger was granted a fair opportunity to choose between
higher or lower liability limits. 0 6 When carriers at-
tempted to totally exculpate their liability, the Supreme
Court has demurred, finding:
The great object of the law governing common carriers
was to secure the utmost care in the rendering of a service
of the highest importance to the community. A carrier
who stipulates not to be bound to the exercise of care and
diligence "seeks to put off the essential duties of his employ-
ment." It is recognized that the carrier and the individual
customer are not on equal footing. "The latter cannot af-
ford to higgle [sic] or stand out and seek redress in the
courts." 1
07
Despite the highest court's ruling on this issue, some
courts prior to deregulation upheld exculpatory clauses.
The leading case which permits an air carrier to exculpate
itself from all liability is Lichten v. Eastern Airlines.'0 8 In
Lichten, the passenger sought to recover damages in ex-
cess of $3,000 for jewelry stolen from her baggage while
in the possession of the carrier.'0 9 The applicable tariff
specifically provided that the carrier would not be liable
(N.D. I1. 1986) ("The courts have held that for limitation provisions to be consid-
ered reasonably communicated, the face of the ticket must contain conspicuous
language directing the passenger's attention to the contractual terms contained in
other parts of the ticket.").
I')'! See, e.g., New York, N. H. & H. R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 135 (1953)("But only by granting its customers a fair opportunity to choose between higher
or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater or lesser charge can a car-
rier lawfully limit recovery to an amount less than the actual loss sustained.");
Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317, 321-23 (1921); Boston & Me. R.R. v.
Piper, 246 U.S. 439, 445 (1918); Santa Fe & Phoenix R.R. v. Grant Bros. Constr.
Co., 228 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1913).
,,,7 New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 346 U.S. at 136 (citations omitted).
. 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
Id. at 940.
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for any jewelry lost from a passenger's baggage.11 0 The
passenger argued that the Act should not be interpreted
to permit the CAB to modify the common-law rule that a
carrier may not contractually relieve itself from liability
for the consequences of its own negligence."' The Sec-
ond Circuit ruled, however, that since the Act did not in-
clude an express provision prohibiting a carrier from
exempting itself from liability for lost or damaged bag-
gage, this exclusion indicated that such an exemption was
not forbidden by the CAB." 2
Courts have rarely followed" 13 and have more often crit-
icized the decision reached in Lichten." 4 Nonetheless, air
carriers continued to invoke exculpatory clauses as a de-
fense to liability even where the CAB ruled that a particu-
lar exculpatory provision was unlawful. In Klicker v.
Id. "Money,jewelry .. .and similar valuables . . .will be carried only at the
risk of the passenger." Id.
III Id. at 941.
11 id. The court found that the Civil Aeronautics Act was similar to the Inter-
state Commerce Act. Since the Interstate Commerce Act contained an express
provision prohibiting exemption from liability for any lost or damaged baggage
which was caused by the carrier, the absence of such a provision in the Civil Aero-
nautics Act compelled the conclusion that the exemption was not forbidden to air
carriers. Id.
" See Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413 F.2d 1401 (2nd Cir. 1969)
(adopting the Lichten court's rejection of a claim that misdelivery deprives a carrier
of a tariff limiting liability).
,4 See, e.g., Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, 563 F.2d 1310, 1313-14 (9th Cir.
1977) ("Lichten makes little sense from the standpoint of ordinary rules of statu-
tory construction and none when the legislative history of the Interstate Com-
merce Act and Civil Aeronautics Act is read."); Odom v. Pacific N. Airlines, 393
P.2d 112, 116 (Alaska 1964) (refusing to adopt the Lichten rationale); Davis v.
Northeast Airlines, 362 A.2d 208, 209-10 (N.H. 1976); Note, Air-Carrier Tariff Pro-
visions Limiting Liability for Negligence, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1282, 1287-88 (1957)
("[Ijt's doubtful whether a carrier should be permitted to exempt itself from all
liability for negligence, since the elimination of liability might reduce the deter-
rents to negligent conduct."); Recent Cases, Air Law-Tariff Provision Filed with CAB
Frees Carrier from Liability for Negligent Loss ofJewelry in Passenger's Baggage, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 341, 342-43 (1951) (analyzing the Lichten reasoning and posing several
potential errors in the court's reasoning); Recent Developments, 21 FORDHAM L.
REV. 64 (1952) (noting that Congress never allowed non air carriers to exempt
themselves completely from liability, the article explains: "Congress may not be
deemed to have intended, by remaining silent, to permit air carriers to enforce a
contract provision for exemption of liability uniformly forbidden to all other types
of carriers in the interstate scheme.").
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Northwest Airlines,'15 a couple sued Northwest Airlines for
the wrongful death of their valuable golden retriever car-
ried as baggage in the cargo compartment. 1 6 Northwest
defended this action by relying on three tariffs which fully
exculpated it from any liability for injury to animals in
transport, or alternatively limited its liability to a stated
sum."t 7 The CAB had previously ruled that the exculpa-
tory tariffs in question were unlawful." 8 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, therefore, refused to follow the rationale in Lichten,
finding that "it [was] flatly wrong.''1 19
At the core of the court's rationale in Klicker was the
understanding that the Act did not abrogate preexisting
federal common law. 120 Before Congress drafted the Act,
federal common law prevented a common carrier from
completely exculpating itself from its own negligent acts.
Today, with a return to federal common-law principles,
exculpatory provisions are, once again, unenforceable.
One postderegulation decision, however, held that carri-
ers may exculpate themselves from liability for certain ar-
ticles. In Dopf v. United Airlines,' 2 1 the court's ruling was
based upon the erroneous belief that the industry was still
regulated and that the CAB, pursuant to its primary juris-
diction, had approved exculpatory provisions. 122
Although it appears clear that exculpatory clauses are
unlawful and will not be enforced in the postderegulation
era, air carriers' baggage tariffs and conditions of carriage
typically contain exculpatory provisions. In a recent mag-
azine publication by a major carrier, for example, one
page was devoted to the carrier's "flight plan" and con-
tained the following notice to its readers: "[The carrier]
563 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1312 (The couple alleged that the animal was valued at $35,000).
117 Id.
"" Hughes Air Corp., 40 Fed. Reg. 1121, 1122 & n.5 (1975).
Klicker, 563 F.2d at 1314.
Id. The court "refused to impute to Congress an intent to abrogate silently
this area of the common law." Id.
12 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
1 Id. at 17,837.
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will not be responsible for money, jewelry, cameras, video
and electronic equipment, silverware, negotiable papers,
securities, business documents, samples, paintings, anti-
ques, artifacts, manuscripts, furs, irreplaceable books or
publications and similar valuables contained in checked or
unchecked baggage."'123 This provision would prohibit
the passenger from purchasing excess valuation on these
items, or collecting the minimum baggage valuation or
limitation from the carrier for any of these items if they
were lost or damaged. Air carriers would be wise to drop
the disfavored exculpatory clauses entirely in favor of a
rigid dollar limit. For example, a carrier who excluded all
liability to its passenger for a bag containing $100,000 in
jewelry may run afoul of public policy and subject itself to
liability for the passenger's entire $100,000 loss. On the
other hand, by clearly limiting liability to a fixed amount
($1,250) and offering excess valuation insurance for an
additional charge, the carrier fully protects itself against
this exposure.
Air carriers' reluctance to abandon exculpatory clauses
may stem from the belief that they represent a deterrent
to outrageous or fraudulent claims. Compelling argu-
ments exist for allowing a carrier to place all risk of trans-
porting valuable or fragile items upon the passenger.
One such argument is that articles of exceptional value
should be handled by alternative means; the most practi-
cal alternative being for the passenger to carry the articles
on her person.
At least one postderegulation decision has ruled that an
air carrier may limit its liability for lost or destroyed bag-
gage, so long as the carrier permits the passenger to pro-
tect the baggage by either carrying it on board the aircraft
or purchasing excess valuation insurance. 124 In Coughlin,
the tariff in question provided that "valuables should be
123 SPIRIT, Oct. 1989, at 12. This publication is the magazine of Southwest
Airlines.
1'2 Coughlin v. Trans World Airlines, 847 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1988).
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carried personally by the passenger."'' 1 5 The court's
holding permitting the carrier to limit its liability, and al-
lowing the passenger alternative means of protecting its
transported baggage, was an application of the carrier's
tariff in keeping with federal common-law principles.12 6
Even though this court acknowledged that carrying a valu-
able article on the person of the passenger is an alterna-
tive to excess valuation, the court still held that the carrier
was subject to the released value.'2 7 Accordingly, the air
carrier was still obligated to pay the passenger the re-
leased value. This holding is contrary to the position tra-
ditionally adhered to by air carriers, that they are not
bound to pay the released value on certain transported
items.
V. DISCUSSION OF AIR CARRIERS' OPTIONS TO ENSURE
LIMITED LIABILITY
The CAB's enactment of the sunset provisions found in
14 C.F.R. §§ 253 and 254 may have lulled air carriers into
believing the status quo would be maintained in reference
to baggage claim actions. As the postderegulation case
law develops, it can readily be determined that neither the
CAB nor air carriers considered the sufficiency of the sun-
set provisions in conjunction with the controlling federal
common law. If air carriers incorporate new procedures
in their contracts to meet these changes, however, they
should be able to enjoy continued protection from unlim-
ited liability in baggage claim actions.
A. Accept Responsibility for All Property Transported
The released valuation doctrine was never intended as
an avenue for carriers to exculpate themselves from liabil-
ity. Even though a few preregulation decisions permitted
12 Id. at 1433.
10Id.
,., Id. at 1433-34. The ticket agent's error in refusing to allow the passenger
the right to carry her valuables on her-person rendered the liability limitation
unenforceable. Id.
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carriers to avoid all liability for lost or damaged baggage,
these decisions were in clear derogation of the federal
common law. The unanswered question is why the CAB
approved air carriers' tariffs which contained exculpatory
language, then later struck down such provisions when
they were brought to the CAB's attention. It is likely that
many carriers successfully exculpated themselves at the
trial court level because the courts misunderstood how
the CAB's primary jurisdiction interfaced with the federal
common law. At this time, however, there should be no
misunderstanding that exculpatory provisions are invalid.
Accordingly, carriers should subject all transported prop-
erty to the released value, or risk being fully liable for the
property.
B. Provide Legally Sufficient Notice to Passengers
Consumer groups would perhaps argue that actual no-
tice, presented to the passenger in express written form,
would provide better protection to the public. If written
notice were given separate from the ticket coupon, how-
ever, the only foolproof manner to ensure that the pas-
senger received the notice would be to require the
passenger's signature on the written notice. This method
is clearly impractical. Providing actual notice to the pas-
senger presents endless difficulties. For example, many
passengers purchase their ticket from a travel agent and
consequently never approach the airline's ticket counter.
Curbside check-in would no longer be a quick service al-
ternative for passenger check-in. Finally, long ticket
counter lines would become even longer as each passen-
ger would be required to read the baggage provisions and
sign the notice.
A clearly acceptable method of ensuring that the pas-
senger receives proper notice of the limitation of liability
and incorporated terms, is to provide this notice on the
face of the passenger's ticket. Traditionally, carriers have
provided notice on a separate page of the passenger's
ticket coupon. Courts have not been opposed to the re-
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quired written notice provisions being placed on the pas-
senger ticket, but rather, have opposed the manner in
which this notice was provided.' 28 Therefore, if carriers
conformed the written notice contained on the passenger
ticket to meet federal standards, actual notice should not
be required.
To invoke its limitation of liability, federal common law
requires the carrier to provide clear and conspicuous no-
tice of the limitation of liability, incorporated within the
ticket coupon and the other documents which the passen-
ger does not have in his possession but of which he is
deemed to have notice. From the decision in Deiro, it is
clear that the written notice provisions currently utilized
by carriers on the ticket coupon are probably insuffi-
cient.' 29 Deiro and related decisions lead to the conclusion
that a carrier must give foremost consideration to the no-
tice provision which is printed on the face of the ticket. At
the present time, the notice provision printed on the face
of the ticket is inconspicuous. To comply with federal
standards, this notice must be of such size, type, print and
color as to bring itself to the passenger's attention. It
should substantively warn the passenger that there are
other provisions contained within the ticket coupon which
the passenger will be bound to and therefore should
read. 3 0 In the past, air carriers have typically given the
passenger notice that certain items should be carried on
their person in the published tariff and the conditions of
carriage booklet. In view of the fact that carriers may not
exculpate themselves for valuable and fragile items, air
carriers should now consider providing this notice within
the ticket coupon itself.
"28 See supra notes 80-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases focus-
ing on the manner of notice provided by the carrier.
121, See supra notes 83-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the notice
implications of the Deiro decision.




There are several practical details that air carriers can
monitor to enhance the viability of their limitation of lia-
bility. Air carriers uniformly provide a sign at the ticket
counter notifying the passenger of the carrier's limitation
of liability and incorporated terms. This sign, however, is
often not visible to the passenger because of its usual lo-
cation on the front of the ticket counter. The passenger's
view of this sign is blocked by other passengers waiting in
the ticket line.
Air carrier's employees need to be fully aware of the
conditions of carriage pertaining to baggage and should
attempt to abide by these conditions to prevent the invali-
dation of the contract. The TWA ticket agent's refusal to
permit a passenger to carry her husband's cremated re-
mains on board the aircraft in Coughlin is an example of
this potential harm. 3 1 Because the carrier's tariff specifi-
cally stated that valuables "should be carried personally
by the passenger," and the carrier's ticket agent pre-
vented the passenger from doing so, the court held that
the ticket agent's actions voided the contract of carriage
and subjected the carrier to liability beyond the released
value. 132
Another consideration for the carrier concerns the pre-
flight transfer of baggage. When a carrier's personnel re-
move baggage from a passenger who has already boarded
a plane, the passenger loses the opportunity to purchase
excess coverage and can no longer secure protection for
the property by carrying it on their person. If the prop-
erty is damaged, this action by the attendant would likely
void the contract and subject the carrier to unlimited
liability.
,il Coughlin, 847 F.2d at 1433-34; see supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Coughlin case.
.32 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the CAB desired to maintain the status
quo for air carriers with respect to their liability for lost,
delayed or damaged baggage. In some respects, this de-
sire was accomplished by federal regulations allowing air
carriers to utilize the released valuation doctrine and in-
corporate certain terms by reference into the contract of
carriage. The CAB, however, did not foresee that federal
common-law principles, which would govern baggage ac-
tions after deregulation, would place additional require-
ments on air carriers that they were not prepared to
address.
The reversion to federal common-law principles in the
area of baggage actions necessitates a change in current
practice by the air carriers. Although only a few baggage
claim actions have been decided since the industry was
deregulated, these decisions highlight areas on which air
carriers must concentrate in order to preserve any right to
limit their liability. Foremost consideration must be given
by air carriers to bringing the limitation of liability to the
passenger's attention. To satisfy this requirement air car-
riers must alter their traditional methods of providing no-
tice of the baggage limitation to the passenger. The
courts will no longer presume that the passenger has
knowledge of the limitation. The carrier must utilize
more advanced methods to demonstrate that reasonable
efforts were made to bring the limitation to the attention
of the passenger. Additionally, air carriers must stop us-
ing exculpatory clauses and provide excess coverage for
all items transported. Air carriers failing to modify their
past policies run the risk of reimbursing the passenger for
the actual value of the entire contents of the lost or de-
stroyed baggage. Any court that properly applies the fed-
eral common law will not uphold an exculpatory clause.
